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Introduction 
 
As well as the provision of water as a private good for residential and business 
customers, water companies are responsible for management actions that 
affect the provision of public goods. This is well recognised and for this, as well 
as social policy reasons, the market operations of such companies are publicly 
regulated. Water customers pay a flat rate for water provision, either on 
property value or measured consumption. In the process of water provision the 
management of water companies has discretion on how to achieve targets of 
water delivery and waste water disposal to satisfy demand, subject to legal 
minimum standards. In doing so they also jointly provide certain levels of ‘public 
goods’, such as bathing water quality, water quality in rivers, risk of flood in 
case of piping malfunctions etc.  
The supply of water delivery targets is compatible with a large variety of 
combinations of different levels of related public goods. Optimal supply level will 
depend of on consumer preferences and willingness to pay for alternative 
levels of joint supply of the private/public good package. Such preferences 
cannot be derived from market transactions because customers cannot shop 
around for different levels of provisions of the public goods associated with 
water supply. An alternative way to investigate these preferences is via 
statements of choice. 
Stated preference studies have recently established themselves as an 
important method to guide public good provision in joint production processes. 
In the recent periodic price review in the UK, which will set the water tariff for 
2004-09, a leading UK water company, Yorkshire Water, employed this 
approach to guide their management decisions in accordance with the 
preferences of the customers they serve. In this chapter we present the results 
of a portion of a much larger study. In that study a series of choice experiments 
was administered to a representative sample of Yorkshire Water residential 
customers. We focus on two of these choice experiments that address issues 
of preferences for the quality of ‘public good’ aspects of waste water disposal 
and treatment.   
The first choice-experiment illustrated here (WW1) deals with the way 
customers trade-off money with the percentage of area protected from sewage 
flooding (AF), the percent of river length capable of supporting healthy fisheries 
and other aquatic life in the long term (RQ), and the number of 
businesses/households exposed to bad odour and flies (OF). The second 
experiment reported in this chapter (WW2) looks at how customers trade-off 
money with the number of areas with waste water discharges designed to allow 
recreational activities on rivers (AM), and the standard of sewage works and 
disinfection designed to exceed government standards for bathing water (BB). 
In this paper we depart from the conventional way of analyzing 
multinomial discrete choice responses via multinomial logit model and mixed 
logit models. The major focus of the analysis is an alternative characterization 
of preference heterogeneity via finite mixing (Provencher, et al. 2002) or latent 
class analysis (Boxall and Adamovicz, 2002). This approach, perhaps less 
elegant and flexible than the continuous mixing allowed by mixed logit, is 
shown to have some appeal on the basis of ease of interpretation of the utility 
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functions of each preference group, ease of computation, and interpretation of 
the results obtained. The main feature is that, instead of a continuous of taste 
intensities for each attribute of choice, it provides the preference structure for 
each of a small number – two to five – groups in the sample. The probability of 
membership to each group is endogenous, although the number of groups is 
exogenously imposed, albeit statistically tested for. 
On the basis of such preference estimates, we exploit the panel nature 
of the dataset to retrieve the distribution of part-worths (marginal willingness-to-
pay values) for the individual in the sample, conditional on the individual 
sequence of observed choices in the choice experiment. This also departs from 
customary approaches in which the willingness to pay estimates are normally 
expressed as measures of central tendency of an a-priori distribution, such as 
mean or median value estimates with their computed standard errors. Instead, 
we compare and contrast the conditional kernel-smoothed distributions of these 
values estimated for each individual for as series of finite mixing models and for 
the mixed logit with normally distributed utility parameters. 
In both samples we find statistical evidence in favour of the existence of 
four distinct preference groups. We argue that in some cases an immediate 
interpretation of the differences between groups is possible. While most 
preference structures in the groups are consistent with theoretical expectations 
in terms of signs, groups representing small fractions of the sample tend to 
show low significance of parameter estimates. Finally, the graphical 
representation of the distributions, of individual estimates of willingness-to-pay 
values for the attributes, show that while the 2 and 3 group latent class models 
(LCM) portray bi-modal WTP distributions, the 4 -group latent class 
specification implies WTP distributions very similar to those produced by the 
normally-distributed mixed logit. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 first 
provides a background to the representation of taste heterogeneity in finite and 
continuous preference mixture logit models; and then briefly discusses the 
subject of heterogeneity in logit-based random utility modelling. Section 3 
documents the data sources; whilst section 4 addresses the econometric 
issues. The results are presented and discussed in section 5, and section 6 
draws some conclusions. 
 
 
Heterogeneity in random utility-based multinomial logit models 
 
Taste heterogeneity and mixed logit 
 
The last decade has seen much attention paid to the development of alternative 
forms of modelling heterogeneity of preferences in discrete multinomial choice 
models based on random utility (Train 2003). It is a fact of life that preferences 
dictating decision rules vary across both individuals and choices made by the 
same individual. Taste heterogeneity, as captured by mixed logit models (or 
random parameter logit) is often quite instructive in this context, and it virtually 
allows the researcher to approximate any preference structure (McFadden and 
Train 2000). The notion that parameters of the utility function can vary 
according to continuous parametric distributions has greatly expanded the 
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number of modelling assumptions available to researchers. Even the few 
limitations originally imposed by the relative restrictive set of empirically 
tractable taste distributions has recently been overcome by more flexible forms 
that allow for censoring and bounding (Train and Sonnier 2003; Hensher and 
Greene 2003). The underlying hypothesis in this modelling approach is a 
continuity of preferences over some range of parameter values. 
 
 
Variance heterogeneity and heteroskedastic logit 
 
Even if preferences are fairly stable, decision contexts and respondent 
knowledge or cognitive ability may vary, thereby introducing sources of 
heterogeneity in observed choice. One example of this source is the effect of 
choice-complexity and respondent familiarity with the choice task on the scale 
parameter of the unobserved component of utility, as illustrated empirically by 
deShazo and Fermo (2002). However, for those more inclined to think in terms 
of heteroskedasticity as the presence of co-variates affecting the error variance, 
instead of the scale parameter one can make the error variance a function of 
co-variates (e.g. Scarpa, Ruto et al. 2003). Either approach models 
heterogeneity affecting the spread of the noise or unobserved component 
(error) of utility in logit models. These models are normally called 
heteroskedastic logit, not to be confused with the Heteroskedastic Extreme 
Value model originally proposed by Bhat (1995). In this category of models a 
different scale parameter is fitted to each alternative in the set. One interesting 
recent example of heteroskedastic logit in the context of meta-design is the 
paper by Caussade et al. 2003, in which factors affecting the design of the 
choice-experiments are shown to have a systematic effect on the variance of 
the error term, along with individual-specific covariates. 
 
 
Observed and unobserved taste heterogeneity 
 
From the researcher’s perspective we find it quite useful to think of 
heterogeneity as observed and unobserved. When some individual-specific 
variables that the researcher can observe can be linked to systematic 
differences in choice behaviour, for example by creating interaction terms 
between attributes or alternatives with such individual-specific variables, then 
preference heterogeneity across individuals can be captured (Pollack and 
Wales 1992).   
On the other hand, when differences in taste for attributes are known to 
exist, but the available individual-specific variables cannot adequately capture 
this variability, then a generic form of heterogeneity of taste can be simply 
accommodated by mixed logit models, assuming that some attributes have 
taste parameters distributed according to some distributive law.  
Of course, a single dataset can still display an amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity of taste, when unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for 
(Scarpa et al. 2001), and hybrid models accounting for individual specific 
effects on the unobserved component of taste heterogeneity can be estimated. 
For example, by making the mean of a normally distributed parameter 
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dependent upon some individual-specific variable [Nlogit v.3 allows for such a 
model, but the default application constrains standard deviations to be the 
same]. 
 
 
Continuous versus finite taste heterogeneity 
 
Mixed logit models assume heterogeneity to be continuous over the interval 
spanned by the assumed distribution for the varying taste parameters. For 
example, if no theoretical reason exists to limit the domain of a parameter 
value, one can assume a normal distribution. In that case the range of 
parameter values spans the real line and the values of the estimated mean and 
variance will dictate the probability with which these values are found in each 
segment of the line. A correlation structure can also be estimated. For example, 
if more than one parameter is normally distributed and there are reasons to 
believe that they are not independent then the correlation structure can be 
estimated (Train, 1998). The structure of correlation can be informative for joint 
probability inference and segmentation of taste groups (Scarpa, Spalatro and 
Canavari 2003, Scarpa and Del Giudice 2004). 
However, the computational cost of estimating mixed logit with 
continuous distributions is high, especially when parameters need to be 
bounded in their domain for theoretical reasons (Train and Sonnier 2003). 
Furthermore, some research questions are best answered through the 
identification of defined preference groups, with homogenous preferences 
within the group. For example, from the perspective of a water company that 
wishes to optimize its management plan according to the preferences of its 
customers, the identification of such preference groups can be informative in 
allocating services accordingly. 
This poses the practical query of identifying the size, number and 
preference structure of these distinct preference groups. This approach is 
sometime referred to as finite mixing (Provencher et al. 2002) or latent class 
modelling (Swait 1994). Although the latent class finite / mixing approach is well 
established theoretically (Heckman and Singer 1984) and in the econometric 
application of count models (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, section 4.8), despite 
its relative merits it does not seem to be very popular in multinomial discrete 
choice models.  
Recent applications include three travel cost revealed preference studies 
in recreational site choice (Provencher et al. 2002; Shonkwiler and Shaw 2003; 
Scarpa and Thiene 2004). Provencher et al. 2002 assume group membership 
to be conditional on individual characteristics and a serially correlated error 
structure across the sequence of one individual’s choices. They conclude that 
there is evidence of time dependence across choices and that finite mixing (as 
they called it) is a convenient and intuitive alternative to mixed logit, especially 
in terms of computational cost. They find evidence for three separate 
preference groups. 
Shonkwiler and Shaw 2003, also assume group membership to be 
conditional on individual characteristics, and observe how the two-group 
models they estimate display different marginal utility of income. They suggest 
that this could be an elegant yet uncomplicated way to allow for non-linear 
6 
 
preferences for money. This has implications in the valuation of attributes, 
which differ across groups. They also, like us in this paper, identify the potential 
use of posterior probabilities, although they do not seem to use them in the 
derivation of their welfare estimates. 
Scarpa and Thiene (2004) investigate destination choices of rock-
climbers in the North Eastern Alps and assume group membership to be semi-
parametric. They find evidence of four preference groups and derive individual-
specific welfare measures for various attributes and illustrate how to investigate 
the distribution of benefit and losses from a given policy in the sample. 
Recent stated preference applications using latent class models (LCM) 
include Hensher and Greene (2003), in which the authors use a dataset on 
choice of road types in New Zealand and systematically contrast the merits of 
mixed logit with those of latent class modelling. Comparisons are carried out in 
terms of choice elasticities, distributions of predicted choice probabilities and 
changes in absolute choice shares. Based on the results from this data-set they 
conclude that no unambiguous recommendation can be made as to the 
superiority of any of the two approaches, although they find strong statistical 
support for the LCM approach with three preference groups. 
Boxall and Adamovicz (2002), conduct a lucid investigation using factor 
analysis to determine the motivational determinants of trips to wilderness, and 
build individual specific factor loadings that are then used as determinants in 
the group membership equation. Their analysis supports the existence of four 
group preferences and a much richer interpretation than a conventional 
multinomial logit model. They do not contrast this approach with continuous 
taste heterogeneity models, such as mixed logit. 
Scarpa, Drucker et al. 2003, use LCM analysis as an accessory to a 
more conventional conditional heterogeneity multinomial logit analysis of the 
choice of piglet breeds, in an effort to value an indigenous pig breed in 
Yucatan. They find evidence for two distinct preference groups, using 
membership equations including various individual specific variables.  
As both theoretical and empirical evidence on the usefulness of finite 
mixed logit models is mounting we observe that little attention has been 
devoted to one of its most promising features to inform decision makers. This is 
the identification of conditional distributions of attribute valuations. Although 
conditional probabilities can be computed even with one single choice per 
individual, the more numerous the panel, the sharper is the estimation of 
individual posterior statistics. Such a feature is of particular interest in the 
context of motivating the collection of panel data on consumer’s choice. 
 
 
Choice experiment data  
 
In spring and summer 2002, as a part of a large-scale investigation into the 
preference structure of its customers, Yorkshire Water conducted a set of 
choice experiments. The aim was to characterize the preference for fifteen 
different attributes related to water provision, called here service factors (SFs). 
As a result of focus-group activities and discussion with the management, these 
SFs were separated into five groups, giving rise to five separate choice 
experiments. The first three were mostly concerned with SFs of a private good 
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nature, and are ignored here. In this study we are concerned with the two 
choice experiments that addressed attributes of the service that can be 
commonly interpreted as ‘public goods’.  
The first choice experiment, defined here as WW1, looked at four 
attributes: area flooding by sewage (AF); river quality (RQ); nuisance from 
odour and flies (OF); and cost of service (change in water bill payment). There 
were eight levels of payment expressed as increases or decreases on the 
current bill, while all other attributes were expressed at four levels. The design 
chosen was an orthogonal main effect factorial with a total of 32 profiles, which 
were split in sequences of four choices for each respondent. 
The second choice experiment looked at three attributes: water 
amenities for recreation (AM); quality of bathing water (BB), and cost of service. 
There were seven levels of payment expressed as increases or decreases on 
the current bill, while all other attributes were expressed at three levels. The 
orthogonal main effect factorial of choice gave a total of 27 cards, which were 
also split in sequences of four choices for each respondent. 
The survey instrument was tested in a pilot study and further refined as a 
consequence. It was finally administered face-to-face by personnel experienced 
in stated-preference questionnaires through a computer-assisted survey. A 
representative sample of 767 Yorkshire Water residential customers completed 
the sequence of choices in the first choice experiment for a total of 3,068 
choices (sample WW1), and a representative sample of 777 residential 
customers completed the sequence for the second choice experiment with a 
total of 3,108 choices (sample WW2). 
A full report on the study and the tested validity of the chosen 
experimental design are available to the interested reader (Scarpa and Willis 
2002, Willis and Scarpa 2002). 
 
 
Econometric issues 
 
The derivation of the latent class logit model is based on a membership 
equation, and on a choice alternative equation, both of which turn out to have a 
convenient logit formulation when two independent Gumbel-distributed error 
components are used. 
The membership equation explains the probabilistic assignment into a 
number of K groups, where K is exogenously defined and outside the space of 
estimable parameters. The choice probability equation explains the mechanics 
of probabilistic choice across alternatives based on a conventional random 
utility framework.  For the sake of brevity, and to avoid unduly repetition, we 
refer the reader to cited works for the details of the formal derivation. In this 
study, we have adopted the approach documented in Hensher and Greene 
(2003), which is conveniently applicable using Nlogit version 3. 
In brief, our specification does not use any socio-economic covariate in 
the membership probability specification, which assumes therefore a semi-
parametric format for the membership probabilities. The utility function for each 
of the three alternatives in each choice context is simply specified as a function 
of the attribute values. 
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The main focus of this study is to compare estimates of marginal WTP 
for attributes conditional on the sequence of observed choices from a balanced 
panel. We run this comparison across different group-sized latent class models 
(2, 3 and 4 LCM), and with the mixed logit specification with all attributes but 
cost distributed normal and zero off-diagonal covariance (MXL). The emphasis 
on conditional WTP estimate is justified on the basis of the interest that a water 
company can have in identifying groups with specific public-good preferences 
and WTP amongst its customers, so as to better address and target 
management plans.  In what follow we describe in some detail the derivation of 
the individual WTP values from the LCM and MXL models. 
 
 
Derivation of conditional WTP estimates from LCM models 
 
Consider a population with c preference-groups (or classes) and a sequence of 
four observed choices per t individual over J alternatives, including the status-
quo. Given a sequence of four choices by the same individual and conditional 
on belonging to a given preference group or class c, say for example class A, 
the joint logit probability of a sequence is: 
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With the individual probabilities of membership to a group c defined as 
Qtc one can derive the unconditional probability taking the expectation over all 
the c classes: 
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where in this study the C= 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
A conditional estimate of the individual-specific class probability can be 
obtained given the observed sequence of four choices and using Bayes’ 
formula: 
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where yt and xt are respectively the observed choices and the attributes of the 
alternatives in the choice set. 
Given this set of individual-specific probabilities of membership in each 
preference-group c, one can derive individual-specific conditional estimates of 
the marginal WTP as: 
4)    ( )*1ˆ ccCt tccWTP Q βγ== − ,  
where ˆcγ is the marginal utility of money.  
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Notice that Nlogit v. 3 allows you to store the values for the posterior 
individual parameter *
1
ˆ
C
t tc cc
Qβ β
=
= by using the subcommand “;parameters” in 
the vector “beta_i”. However, setting  
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is obviously incorrect. So, this part was computed in Gauss.1 
 
 
Derivation of conditional WTP estimates from MXL models 
 
Train (2003, Ch. 11) discusses the derivation of posterior means for normally 
distributed parameters of taste, conditional on observed choices in mixed logit 
models.  
In our mixed logit specification the marginal utility of income γ is fixed, so 
the distribution of estimates for the individual specific WTP for each attribute is 
given by the mean of the individual parameter distribution tβ  divided by -γ, 
which is assumed to be fixed. 
In general, tβ  is to be found by taking the expectation of the parameter 
over the parameter distribution conditional on observed choices and parameter 
estimates:  
 
6)    ( | , , )t t th y x dβ β β θ β= ⋅  
 
By Bayes’ rule: 
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t t t t
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where ( | )g β θ  is the assumed distribution of the parameter in the entire 
population (in our case assumed to be normal, so θ = {µ, σ2}). So: 
 
8)  ( | , ) ( | )( | , , ) ( | , ) ( | )
t t
t t t
t t
P y x g d
h y x d
P y x g d
β β β θ ββ β β θ β β β θ β= ⋅ =



 
Because of the non-closed form of these expressions, in practice one 
uses simulation methods. Posterior simulated estimates of tβ  can be obtained 
in Nlogit v.3 for each individual by using the subcommand “;parameters” in the 
“RPL” estimation routine and are automatically stored in the matrix “beta_i”. 
The one used here were obtained using 100 Halton draws (Train, 2000). 
 
 
                                               
1
 We understand from personal communication from Bill Greene, the author of Nlogit and LimDep, that 
future versions of Nlogit will include a routine to compute these values. 
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Number of groups with different preferences 
 
The number of groups with different preferences is not part of the maximization 
process from which the parameter estimates are derived. In other words it is 
outside the space of the estimable parameters. The conventional specification 
tests used for maximum likelihood estimates (likelihood ratio, Lagrange 
Multipliers and Wald tests) are not valid in this context because they do not 
satisfy the regularity conditions for a limiting chi-square distribution under the 
null. 
Resampling from the empirical distribution is feasible but very impractical 
because of the computational complexity it involves. As a guidance some 
authors have used the Akaike information criterion: AIC = − 2 × lnL − P, where 
lnL is the log-likelihood of the model at convergence, and P is the number of 
estimated parameters in the model. Others have suggested the Bayesian 
Information Criterion: BIC = − lnL + (P/2) × ln(N), where N is the number of 
respondents. Boxall and Adamovicz (2002) also used the Akaike Likelihood 
Ratio index, which we omit here, since the other two methods provide 
concordant conclusions.  However, these criteria also fail some of the regularity 
conditions under the null for a valid test under the null (Leroux, 1992). The AIC 
is reported to over-estimate the number of groups, while the BIC does not do 
this, asymptotically, although in small sample sizes it tends to favour too few 
groups (McLachlan and Peel 2000).   
 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
For the sake of space we omit the presentation of all the model estimates. The 
testing for the number of preference-groups is reported in Table 1 and it is 
consistent with the hypothesis that there are four distinct groups of preferences 
in the sample in each of the two choice-experiments. We hence only present 
the LCM estimate for 4 classes along with the more ‘conventional’ mixed logit 
model with normally distributed parameters. Such estimates are presented in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
The descriptive statistics of the distribution of conditional WTP estimates 
are reported in Tables 4 and 5. However, these distributions are best illustrated 
graphically by means of normal kernel densities in Figures 1-5, discussed 
below. 
 
 
Preference groups for WW1 
 
Three attributes were investigated in this experiment. The attributes could 
either be improved by YW management from the status quo condition at an 
additional cost to customers; or they could be decreased at the advantage of a 
lower water bill for customers. 
One attribute (RQ) was defined as “the percent of river length capable of 
supporting healthy fisheries and other aquatic life in the long term” and has the 
character of a pure public good. The other two were (AF) defined as “percent of 
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areas protected from sewage escape in gardens, roads, paths and open areas” 
and (OF) “number of households & businesses affected by odour & high 
numbers of flies from sewage treatment works”.  Attributes AF and OF concern 
goods whose benefits are probably perceived by most respondents as accruing 
to other members of the collective, and were therefore special types of mixed 
public goods. For OF the expected sign for the taste parameter is negative for 
people who value improvement, as fewer houses affected means better quality. 
The latent class analysis is consistent with the presence of four groups 
of preferences in the sample. The highest probability (57.33%) belongs to 
preference Group A, followed by preference Group B with 21.68%. Preference 
Group C and D have 17.67 and 3.32 percent respectively.  
Estimates for the taste parameters for attributes are all significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels only in Group A, the group with largest 
probability. This group shows WTP estimates slightly larger but not dissimilar 
from those obtained by the conventional MNL model, except for the OF 
attribute for which this group seem to have a marginal valuation of £1.22, rather 
than £0.93. 
Group B and C have relatively high significance but they do not reach 
conventional significance levels. Group B has valuations practically identical to 
Group A, while the valuations in Group C are smaller by at least a factor of 10 
for AF and RQ, and less than half those for OF. This result is consistent with 
the existence of a small segment of customers (17.7%) with low values for 
these public goods. Group D has the smallest probability and its parameter 
estimates show lowest precision, so this group is ignored in the discussion.  
 
 
Distribution of conditional WTP estimates for Area Flooding 
 
As can be seen the plot of the kernel estimates in Figure 1 shows the 
conditional WTP for each LCM model and for the MXL one. The 2-group LCM 
(dashed line) displays a bi-modal distribution implying the existence of 2 
groups, one with large and another with smaller WTPs. The 3-group LCM 
(dotted line) is also bi-modal, but one modal value is negative, contrary to what 
one would expect, and altogether the distribution implies a much larger spread, 
with 0.41% of the respondents displaying negative WTPs for this attribute. The 
MXL estimates (continuous line) and the 4-group LCM (dashed/dotted line) 
display similar one-peaked modal values, although the latter shows 4.56% of 
respondents with negative values. 
 
 
Distribution of conditional WTP estimates for River Quality 
 
Figure 2 reports similar plots but for the conditional distributions of WTP for 
River Quality. Again, the dashed line of the 2-group LCM displays a bi-modal 
distribution implying the existence of 2 groups, one with large WTPs and 
another with WTPs centred round zero. The dotted line for the 3-group LCM 
also implies a WTP distribution centred round zero with a much larger spread 
and 41% of individuals displaying negative WTPs. The estimates from MXL and 
from the 4-group LCM display similar one-peaked modal values, and both seem 
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more consistent with a-priori expectations as they have much smaller portions 
of the densities with negative values. 
 
 
Distribution of conditional WTP estimates for Odour and Flies 
 
Figure 3 shows the plots of kernels smoothing for the WTP for the number of 
households exposed to nuisance from Odour and Flies. WTP is negative 
because of the way the variable was coded, as improvements are represented 
by a lower number of households, hence a decrease in this value increases 
utility. The pattern observed for the 5 distributions is very similar to the one for 
Area Flooding, although it is developed along the negative orthant. Again MXL 
estimates are closest to 4-group LCM ones.  
Altogether, in this sample the conditional WTP predictions from the LCM 
analysis results show that the selection procedure for the number of groups 
identifies a group composition of four preference groups. Such a model is 
producing conditional WTP distributions consistent with economic theory and 
not very dissimilar from those obtained by the mixed logit model with normally 
distributed parameters for the non-monetary attributes. 
 
 
Preference groups for WW2 
 
This choice experiment investigated preferences for the ability to use inland 
waters for recreation (AM), and for improvements in the quality of bathing 
beaches (BB) above the current mandatory standard. In the choice experiment 
only improvements from the status quo were investigated. So, there was no 
option to reduce the level of provision and gain a reduction in the water bill in 
this case. The latent class estimation identified four distinct preference groups, 
three have large probabilities (Group A 35.05%, Group B 28.41% and Group C 
29.38%), while the fourth (Group D) has only 7.15%.  
When values for AM are estimated using the conventional logit model 
(MNL) one obtains £0.41 per each additional area with waste water discharges 
managed so as to allow recreational activities on rivers. In the LCM results, 
however, it can be seen that in Group A the average valuation is 50% higher 
than the MNL, while in group B is ten times higher and in group C nearly ten 
times smaller, although it does not reach the conventional levels of statistical 
significance. The valuation for Group D, instead is not statistically different from 
zero. 
The MNL values for bathing water quality (BB) for each consecutive 50% 
improvement on the current standard is very low: £0.08. LCM analysis reveals 
that customers in the largest Group A have a valuation of similar magnitude to 
that obtained by MNL. However, the valuation by Group B is ten times higher at 
£0.83, while Group C has a valuation less than half the MNL estimate. Again, 
the valuation for the smallest group (only 7.2%) cannot be discussed due to 
lack of significance of the parameter estimates. 
The fact that Group B has a valuation for these attributes of water 
management ten times higher than the MNL is consistent with a high concern 
for amenity-related public good provision amongst a fraction of the Yorkshire 
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Water residential customers. This group has a probability of 28.41%, nearly 1/3 
of the sample. On the other hand, a similarly sized fraction (29.4%) represented 
by Group C, seem to value these goods much less, and such a result is 
consistent with a polarization of tastes, perhaps linked to diversity in use values 
from recreation. 
 
 
Distribution of conditional WTP estimates for water quality of bathing beaches 
 
Figure 4 shows the kernel smoothing plots of individual WTP for water quality of 
bathing beaches. As in all the other cases the dashed and dotted lines of 
respectively the 2-group and 4-group LCM show a bi-modal distribution. The 
former with a much large taller peak, while the latter with two similar sized 
ones. Altogether they predict small variation in WTP values. 
The dashed/dotted line for the 4-group LCM WTP distributions and the 
continuous line for the mixed logit show a completely different picture. They 
both represent a much spread out distribution, with great variability. In 
particular, the 4-group LCM shows a bi-modal distribution with a large fraction 
of respondents spread around £0.8 per each extra area “with waste water 
discharges designed to allow recreational activities on rivers”. This group of 
customers might be keen recreationists, or people who care strongly for the 
quality of water that the water company can provide in bathing beaches. 
 
  
Distribution of conditional WTP estimates for Water Amenities 
 
A similar pattern is observed in Figure 5 for the plots for WTP for water 
amenities. The distributions of predicted conditional WTPs for 2 and 3 group 
LCM show a bimodal and narrowly spread pattern, while those for the mixed 
logit and 4-group LCM show a much more spread out distribution, only the 
latter, however, shows high densities of conspicuous values. This result would 
seem to indicate that care must be paid in selecting the adequate model when 
the purpose is the analysis of conditional WTP distributions. The choice of 
model can disguise some patterns that might be of interest to water managers, 
such as clear taste segmentation into separate preference-groups, rather than 
a continuum of taste intensities.  
In this case the statistical evidence from the log-likelihood values 
obtained in the analysis would seem to lend some support to the hypothesis 
that a finite group of 4 sets of preferences exists in the sample. The mixed logit 
assumption rests on the belief that taste attributes have a specific continuous 
distribution, in our case the normal. There is no test that can be performed to 
compare LCM with MXL, and hence the choice of heterogeneity specification 
ultimately rests with the researcher and her beliefs. In our empirical case the 
log-likelihood values are once in favour of the 4-group LCM, in the WW1 
sample, and once in favour of the MXL, in the WW2 sample. The LCM 
approach, however, may be desirable in some respects: it does not require 
distributional assumptions, the estimates are relatively easier to compute (no 
simulation methods are needed), and it is consistent with the existence of well-
defined segments in the market for the public good. Finally, at least with 
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respect to the conditional distribution of WTP values, LCM estimation seems to 
produce a richness of information similar to the mixed logit estimation. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This chapter explores alternative ways of modelling heterogeneity of tastes for 
attributes of a composite public good via choice experiments.  It contrasts two 
advanced modelling techniques, the use of the mixed logit random parameter 
model with the use of latent class models, to explain water company customer 
choice; and to derive welfare estimates of changes in the levels of provision of 
a number of ‘public goods’ jointly produced as a function, in part, of changes to 
waste water treatment.   
The mixed logit approach requires the analyst to specify a-priori a 
parameter distribution in the population (normal, log-normal, uniform, etc.), 
which is assumed to characterise the heterogeneity of preferences for that 
attribute.  The choice of distribution from which to report WTP estimates is then 
determined by whatever mixed logit model is perceived to have the best 
‘goodness-of-fit’ statistics and theoretical consistency.   
Latent class modelling (or finite mixing) does not require any 
assumptions about the mixing variable: in a sense LCMs ‘let the data speak’.  
LCMs provide further insights into the data by identifying groups of customers 
who have high or low preferences for particular ‘public goods’; and the share of 
water company customers that these potential purchasers represent.  Such 
form of segmented information is potentially very useful to company managers 
for a wide range of purposes. The LCM analysis could be readily extended to 
assess the significance that socio-economic characteristics of customers, such 
as income or ethnicity, as well as attribute or SF levels have on choice.   
There is no unambiguous test of the superiority of one approach (mixed 
logit or LCM) over the other.  However, the LCM approach may offer insights 
into the heterogeneity of consumer preferences that are not readily identifiable 
through a traditional mixed logit random parameter model, especially when 
there are reasons to believe that these are clustered around certain values. 
Finally, we focussed on estimates of welfare conditional on observed 
choice, in the form of the distribution of marginal willingness to pay values, 
rather than focussing on more conventional estimates of central tendency 
based on a-priori statistics. Conditional distributions are obviously more 
informative than single values, and they should be pursued when possible. We 
would also argue that conditional estimates display richer information because 
they are informed by the observed sequence of choices. Water companies 
intending to adequately characterize the preferences of their customer base 
should endeavour to collect panel data from representative samples. This 
paper shows that even with as few as four choices conditional distributions can 
be usefully derived and studied. Other literature illustrating similar results in this 
field includes Hensher and Greene (2003), Scarpa and Thiene (2004) and 
Greene et al. (forthcoming). 
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Choice experiment ww1 N = 767  
LCM groups Parameters Log-lik. AIC BIC 
1 4 -2213.78 4429.55 2227.06 
2 9 -2092.13 4188.26 2122.02 
3 14 -2063.60 4133.20 2110.10 
4 19 -2027.00 4062.00 2090.10 
5 24 -2020.26 4050.52 2099.97 
     
Choice experiment ww2 N = 777  
LCM groups Parameters Log-lik. AIC BIC 
1 3 -2776.10 5554.21 2786.09 
2 7 -2484.98 4973.96 2508.27 
3 11 -2431.74 4869.47 2468.34 
4 15 -2372.22 4752.43 2422.13 
5 20 -2372.22 4754.43 2438.77 
 
Table 1. Tests for group numbers in latent class models 
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N=767,  
choices= 3,068 
4-Groups LCM  
lnL = -2027, Adj.R2=0.397 
MXL 
ln Sim.L = -2164, Adj.R2=0.357 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Mean St.Dev. 
Area Flooding 
(AF) 
0.012 
(12.21) 
0.950 
(1.58) 
0.451 
(1.32) 
0.710 
(1.13) 
0.017 
(10.67) 
0.015 
(4.36) 
River Quality 
(RQ) 
0.062 
(20.12) 
6.192 
(1.10) 
1.311 
(1.53) 
2.730 
(1.03) 
0.114 
(17.80) 
0.081 
(10.43) 
Odour and Flies 
(OF) 
-0.103 
(-19.94) 
-9.487 
(-1.63) 
-11.094 
(-1.60) 
-2.600 
(-1.02) 
-0.179 
(-14.12) 
0.099 
(6.64) 
Cost -0.084 
(-17.13) 
-7.128 
(-1.65) 
-27.674 
(-1.54) 
2.267 
(1.03) 
-0.161 
(-20.22) 
 
n.a. 
Group 
Probability 
0.573 
(24.68) 
0.217 
(9.98) 
0.177 
(9.04) 
0.033 
(3.88) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Model estimates for sample WW1, asymptotic z-values in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
 
N=777,  
choices= 3,108 
4-Groups LCM  
lnL = -2,752, Adj.R2=0.304 
MXL 
ln Sim.L = -2,328, Adj.R2=0.317 
 Group A Group 
B 
Group 
C 
Group D Mean St.Dev. 
Water Amenities 
(AM) 
0.451 
(6.75) 
0.166 
(15.70) 
0.010 
(1.38) 
-10.005 
(0.00) 
0.160 
(11.15) 
0.038 
(15.54) 
Bathing 
Beaches (BB) 
0.056 
(6.82) 
0.033 
(23.50) 
0.007 
(7.73) 
-0.211 
(-4.23) 
0.028 
(14.11) 
0.081 
(13.13) 
Cost -0.704 
(-7.29) 
-0.039 
(-3.415) 
-0.216 
(-17.93) 
1.777 
(3.50) 
-0.305 
(-20.56) 
 
n.a. 
Group 
Probability 
0.350 
(10.97) 
0.284 
(9.52) 
0.294 
(11.65) 
0.072 
(7.41) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Model estimates for sample WW2, asymptotic z-values in parenthesis 
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Area flooding with sewage 
 LCM-2 LCM-3 LCM-4 MXL 
Mean 0.1260 0.0356 0.1035 0.1036 
St.Dev. 0.0488 0.0990 0.0531 0.0327 
Median 0.1687 0.1225 0.1103 0.1038 
Kurtosis -1.7127 -1.7550 25.3722 0.8207 
Water quality in rivers 
 LCM-2 LCM-3 LCM-4 MXL 
Mean 0.5999 0.1964 0.5970 0.7085 
St.Dev. 0.1878 0.4153 0.2489 0.2845 
Median 0.7642 0.5608 0.5760 0.7771 
Kurtosis -1.7127 -1.7550 18.3691 0.3625 
Nuisance from odour and flies  
 LCM-2 LCM-3 LCM-4 MXL 
Mean -0.9864 -0.8187 -1.0404 -1.1104 
St.Dev. 0.3393 0.4165 0.2954 0.2515 
Median -1.2832 -1.1842 -1.0287 -1.1734 
Kurtosis -1.7127 -1.7550 15.6647 4.7375 
  
Table 4. Statistics of the conditional distributions of WTP in the sample WW1 
 
Water amenities 
 LCM-2 LCM-3 LCM-4 MXL 
Mean 0.4316 0.5705 2.4119 0.5155 
St.Dev. 0.4772 0.2140 1.7605 0.5815 
Median 0.6764 0.5895 1.7713 0.5741 
Kurtosis 1.1024 -1.5857 -1.1759 -0.4934 
Water quality in bathing beaches 
 LCM-2 LCM-3 LCM-4 MXL 
Mean 0.0787 0.1062 0.3560 0.0945 
St.Dev. 0.0637 0.0482 0.2857 0.0961 
Median 0.1114 0.1105 0.2323 0.1059 
Kurtosis 1.1024 -1.5857 -1.2139 -0.6479 
 
Table 5. Statistics of the conditional distributions of WTP in the sample WW2  

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